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During the last three decades our understanding of the brain processes underlying
consciousness and attention has significantly improved, mainly because of the
advances in functional neuroimaging techniques. Still, caution is needed for the
correct interpretation of these empirical findings, as both research and theoretical
proposals are hampered by a number of conceptual difficulties. We review some of
the most significant theoretical issues concerning the concepts of consciousness and
attention in the neuroscientific literature, and put forward the implications of these
reflections for a coherent model of the neural correlates of these brain functions. Even
though consciousness and attention have an overlapping pattern of neural activity,
they should be considered as essentially separate brain processes. The contents of
phenomenal consciousness are supposed to be associated with the activity of multiple
synchronized networks in the temporo-parietal-occipital areas. Only subsequently,
attention, supported by fronto-parietal networks, enters the process of consciousness
to provide focal awareness of specific features of reality.
Keywords: consciousness, attention, neural correlates, fronto-parietal network, global workspace, brain
network, synchronization
INTRODUCTION
During the last three decades the advent and development of new scientific procedures, such as
the functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and the positron emission tomography (PET),
have allowed neuroscientists to study the activity of the living brain. These methods have been
extensively used to determine the activation of brain regions in connection with specific cognitive
functions. Although these tools of scientific investigation have significant limitations in terms of
temporal resolution (Raichle, 1998; Logothetis and Wandell, 2004), they nonetheless have good
performances in spatial resolution. Research programs across all over the world have used them
to identify with an acceptable degree of accuracy the neural correlates of any aspect of mental
activity. The outcome of this massive endeavor relies not only on the technological power of these
instruments, but also on our correct interpretation of the neuroimaging results. As a matter of fact,
a correct analysis of experimental data is of fundamental importance, particularly when human
cognitive functions are studied.
Neural correlates can be described at very different scales, depending on the applied method.
Electrophysiological techniques allow to record signal even from a single cell, and neuronal arrays
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can track real-time interactions at the same micro-scale.
Conversely, neuroimaging instruments are useful to study
phenomena from meso- to macro-scale. The MRI research
constantly tries to improve spatial resolution by reducing the
size of voxels; however, spatial resolution still remains very far
from cellular details. The fMRI methods allow to investigate brain
functions under two conditions: resting state and task. During
the resting state we can analyze the spontaneous activity (which
is sometimes referred to as “intrinsic activity”) of the brain while
the subject is not engaged in a specific task (Biswal, 2012). During
the task condition (which is sometimes referred to as “extrinsic
activity”) we can analyze the state of an individual’s brain while
he or she is engaged in an experimental paradigm, which often
involves the presentation of sensory stimuli (Clark, 2012) – for
a detailed comparison of the two conditions see Smitha et al.
(2017). Both resting state and task experiments are frequently
based on the measurement of the so-called blood oxygenation
level dependent (BOLD) effect (Ogawa et al., 1992). The BOLD
signal represents the changes in the level of oxygenation of a brain
region related to neuronal activations (Pike, 2012). Consequently,
it is supposed to roughly reflect the underlying electrical activity,
though neurovascular coupling is still an open topic of debate
(Pike, 2012). As the BOLD signal is a quasi-quantitative and
indirect measurement of these activations (Pike, 2012; Robertson
and Williams, 2016), fMRI does not allow stricto sensu the direct
manipulation of neuronal firings. However, in task conditions it
is assumed that changes of the BOLD signal shortly before the
presentation of a stimulus correlate with brain activity related to
the processing of that stimulus. Hence, fMRI may to some extent
allow the detection of the effect due to an ongoing manipulation.
A further and more stringent question pertains to the
specificity of the interpretation of a pattern of brain activity
in terms of mental functions. In other words, how confident
can we be when we assign to an observed activation pattern a
specific function? This is often called “reverse inference” and a
dissertation of this topic is beyond the scope of this review (for
an in-depth analysis see Cauda et al., 2019). The debate about
the possibilities, as well as difficulties, of reverse inference is
currently ongoing, involving not only neuroscientific aspects, but
also philosophical and mathematical ones. However, this method
should be applied with caution when dealing with neuroimaging
data (Poldrack, 2006).
In theory, all mental activities might be mapped on the brain
and associated with a specific neural correlate (Nani et al., 2013).
This neural stance (Lamme, 2006) is supposed to be at the basis
of neuroscientific research: a change in the mind (here broadly
conceived as the collection of all the intellectual processes capable
of producing behavioral manifestations, thoughts, and feelings)
must be always accompanied by a change in the brain. However, if
this is now beyond dispute, it is not the other way round: a change
in the brain may not always be accompanied by a change in the
mind. In other words, the relationship between mind and brain
appears to be not symmetrical. From a macro-scale perspective,
different mental functions are supposed to be associated with
different neural correlates; however, different neural correlates
might be associated with the same mental function (for instance,
pain can be processed and felt differently from person to person,
or even by the same person in different times). Furthermore,
there is the tricky question to conceptually distinguish a mental
function from the others. Are two mental functions really distinct
or one can subsume the other? Ideally, we should be able to
define them clearly, which happens very rarely (memory, for
instance, has been successfully divided into different types –
short-term, long-term, episodic, semantic, procedural, etc. –, but
other mental functions, such as language, are so multifaceted and
complex that defy any attempt of precise classification). In light
of these theoretical quandaries, it is still controversial whether
specific neural correlates can be matched precisely to each of the
numerous and various aspects of the human mind.
We can see how theoretical and empirical issues are thickly
intertwined in the quest for understanding consciousness and
attention (Koch, 2006). Although research has been extensive on
both sides, so far there is no agreement on their definition. Some
authors consider attention the sentry at the gate of consciousness
(Zeman, 2001), a fundamental prerequisite for being conscious of
something (James, 1890; Posner, 1994; Velmans, 2000; O’Regan
and Noe, 2001). According to this view, attention should be
thought of as a type of focal awareness and, as a consequence,
the concept of attention should be absorbed in the concept
of consciousness. In contrast, other researchers have provided
evidence that consciousness and attention might be distinct and
separate processes going on in the brain (Baars, 1997; Damasio,
1999; Koch and Tsuchiya, 2007; Dehaene and Changeux, 2011).
According to this view, although we need attentional selection to
get a full conscious access of stimuli, attention and consciousness
should be treated as dissociable brain processes and, therefore, we
should maintain their distinction at the conceptual level.
At least from the psychological point of view, it could be
argued that consciousness and attention seem to refer to different
concepts and mental activities. Consciousness is a broader label
than attention, so much so that we can roughly single out at
least three general conceptions of consciousness: consciousness
as ‘waking state,’ consciousness as ‘experience,’ and consciousness
as ‘mind’ (Zeman, 2001). But other distinctions are possible.
For instance, given its different contents, we can distinguish a
‘phenomenal consciousness’ and an ‘access consciousness’ (Block,
1995). The former is related to how reality appears to us,
while the latter is related to the cognitive availability of certain
information. In this review we will adopt this distinction and
the framework of the two dimensions of consciousness, that is,
the dimension of wakefulness and the dimension of contents
of conscious experience (Cavanna et al., 2013). We consider
phenomenal consciousness as the way the world appears to us,
that is, as the collection of all the possible qualitative features
of reality. In turn, we consider access consciousness as the
availability of a specific content of consciousness, of which we
can become focally aware. These two aspects of consciousness
(phenomenal and focal) conflate with each other under the
control of attention and can find their place in a Cartesian
diagram at the intersection of two points, one related to the level
of wakefulness, vigilance, or alertness, and another related to
the level of intensity, vividness, and focality of each phenomenal
content. In theory, every degree of conscious experience can be
represented in this two-dimensional space (Figure 1).
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FIGURE 1 | A two-dimensional representation of consciousness. The X axis
represents the Content of Consciousness, the experience of which can vary in
vividness. The Y axis represents the Level of Consciousness, or wakefulness,
or vigilance, or arousal. Clinical conditions are in red, while normal
physiological states are in yellow. Solid lines indicate transitions between
states that require a change both of content and of level of consciousness.
Conversely, dashed lines indicate transitions for which one dimension remains
constant.
The concept of attention is no less clear-cut, but can be
analytically sifted as much as the concept of consciousness.
Attention can be selective, that is, it can be focused on a
particular stimulus or object of the world. It can be exogenous
when it is elicited by an external stimulus, or endogenous
when it is elicited by an internal one. It can be involuntary if
it is captivated by an abrupt and sudden stimulus, or it can
be voluntary if it is intentionally concentrated on a certain
thing. Attention can last very briefly, passing from stimulus
to stimulus, or can be sustained for a long time toward a
specific object. Consciousness, on the other hand, does not
appear to have these attributes. First, conscious states are not
under the control of the will. Although conscious states can
be to some extent modulated – by substances like drugs and
alcohol, by practice like meditation (Manuello et al., 2016),
and by attention itself, which selectively processes information
that, thereby, can enters conscious experience –, it simply
happens to us to be conscious every morning when we wake
up from sleep. In contrast, consciousness itself seems to be a
precondition to exert voluntary control of behavior. Second,
consciousness appears to be a self-sustaining process (a stream
or a flow) that extends through two dimensions, the dimension
of the level of vigilance or arousal, and the dimension of
contents (Nani et al., 2013; Cavanna and Nani, 2014). Within
these two dimensions it is possible to have different degree of
consciousness, depending on how much a waking person is
vigilant, alert or aroused, and on how vivid and intense the
contents of the experience are.
The concepts of attention and consciousness, therefore, can be
psychologically separated. The point is now to see whether or not
the distinction at the conceptual level can be maintained at the
neurophysiological level. Do consciousness and attention have
different neural correlates? If so, what is the relationship between
these two functions? Can attention be elicited in individuals
having unconscious perception? And, conversely, are there cases
in which consciousness can occur without attention?
Over the years several experiments have been conducted
in order to answer these questions. This paper discusses the
conceptual issues that stir the debate about the dissociation
of consciousness and attention and reviews the most relevant
studies in the neuroscientific literature that have tried to identify
the neural correlates at the root of these processes. In light of
the results of this research, the final section proposes a model of
neural interaction between consciousness and attention capable
of reconciling the different positions.
SEPARATE FUNCTIONS FOR
ATTENTION AND CONSCIOUSNESS
Broadly speaking, there is common agreement on the idea
that attention is a brain function capable of selecting relevant
information from our sense data. In other words, “the concept
of attention refers to one of the basic characteristics of cognition,
namely the capacity to voluntary and involuntary give priority
to some parts of the information that is available at a given
moment” (Naghavi and Nyberg, 2005). As we have already noted,
attention has the significant property of being either voluntary
or involuntary. This aspect is of fundamental importance,
as it allows to distinguish between two types of attentional
processes: a top-down attention and a bottom-up attention (Kim
et al., 1999; Rosen et al., 1999; Naghavi and Nyberg, 2005).
Top–down attention derives from endogenous factors and is
characterized by a voluntary control exerted by the conscious
mind in order to concentrate on a particular feature (feature-
based attention), object (object-based attention) or region in
space (focal attention). It is a high-level form of attention capable
of selectively exerting concentration on different aspects of a
perceptual scene. In turn, bottom-up attention is a low-level form
of attention which is elicited by exogenous factors; it is therefore
stimulus-driven, automatically triggered by stimuli capable of
attracting one person’s focus.
Undoubtedly, consciousness is strictly related to both types
of attention. However, there seems to be a curious asymmetry
between the two types of attention with regard to their
relationship with consciousness. On the one hand, it seems
that bottom-up attention can direct consciousness on a certain
stimulus. On the other hand, it seems that consciousness can
direct top–down attention on a certain stimulus. In other
words, it seems that bottom–up attention precedes consciousness,
whereas top–down attention follows consciousness. Evidence for
this can be seen in certain types of epileptic crises affecting
both the level and contents of consciousness. During complex
partial seizures, for instance, patients can show an impairment
of the voluntary control of attention (Johanson et al., 2003).
In particular, in those patients top–down attention is so much
affected as to be described as “forced attention,” because it
involves the narrowing of the focus of attention and the absence
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of the voluntary control of its direction. Nonetheless, although
it seems more likely that the dissociation may be possible for
bottom–up attention than for top–down attention, experiments
and clinical reports show that dissociation is possible for both
types of attention.
With regard to top–down attention, a number of experiments
show that it is possible to deploy attention to a stimulus
that remains unavailable to consciousness (Koch and Tsuchiya,
2007; van Boxtel et al., 2010). This effect has been reported
in the attentional manipulation of non-conscious priming and
adaptation, as well as in the attentional cueing of invisible stimuli
(Ansorge and Neumann, 2005; Kiefer and Brendel, 2006; Sumner
et al., 2006). Non-conscious priming is improved by feature-
based (Melcher et al., 2005; Tapia et al., 2010), spatial (Kentridge
et al., 2008; Finkbeiner and Palermo, 2009; Van den Bussche
et al., 2010), and temporal attention (that is, cueing when the
prime or targets appear) (Naccache et al., 2002). The force of
adaptation to perceptually invisible (features of) stimuli such as
orientation (He et al., 1996; Montaser-Kouhsari and Rajimehr,
2004; Kanai et al., 2006; Bahrami et al., 2008a,b; Shin et al.,
2009) or the gender of faces (Shin et al., 2009) is enhanced by
increasing feature-based and spatial attention to these attributes.
Furthermore, there is evidence that attention can be deployed
without conscious registration of a stimulus. This has been
showed by studies investigating attentional cueing effects on
sub-threshold or invisible stimuli (Rajimehr, 2004; Jiang et al.,
2006; Sato et al., 2007; Lin et al., 2008, 2009; Meteyard et al.,
2008; Tsushima et al., 2008; Bauer et al., 2009). A study showed
that the random motion of dot stimuli, whose coherency was
so low that subjects cannot distinguish their directions above
chance, was more distracting for a concurrently performed
central task than the motion of stimuli with high coherency
(Tsushima et al., 2006).
With regard to bottom–up attention, the blind vision
(Weiskrantz, 1997) and other types of zombie behaviors (Koch
and Crick, 2001) show that we can cope with the environment,
at least to some extent, without the help of consciousness. For
instance, in affective blinsight patients exhibit non-conscious
perception of basic emotions (Celeghin et al., 2015), while in
somnambulism or sleepwalking a person can move and even
drive without conscious perception (Hughes, 2007). This kind of
unconscious processing has been also observed in neurological
patients experiencing neglect and extinction (Vallar, 1998), limbic
status epilepticus (Monaco et al., 2005; Cavanna, 2008), as well
as in a number of neuroimaging studies on healthy individuals
(Koch, 2006). In particular, the condition of blindsight, in
which individuals with lesions of the visual areas are able to
avoid obstacles and to point to visual stimuli, provides evidence
that both top–down attention and bottom–up attention can
occur without consciousness. For example, it has been reported
that “the blindsight patient GY has the usual reaction-time
advantages for the detection of targets in his blind visual field
when attentionally cued, even when the cues are located in
his blind field” (Kentridge et al., 2004). There is, therefore,
evidence that attention can occur without conscious processing,
and that attentional selection can modulate the elaboration of
unconscious stimuli (Naccache et al., 2002; Kentridge et al.,
2008). Furthermore, it has been reported that attention can
be oriented to the location of a target stimulus that remains
invisible (McCormick, 1997; Woodman and Luck, 2003). In
other words, evidence suggests that simple or single targets
do not require attentional selection for conscious processing
(Wyart and Tallon-Baudry, 2009).
Experiments show that it is also possible to have a conscious
experience of an object or of an attribute of an object without
actually paying attention to the object or its attributes (Koch
and Tsuchiya, 2007; van Boxtel et al., 2010). As a matter of
fact, we are generally conscious of the world that surrounds
us without directing explicitly attention to all its elements, that
is, without exerting high-level attention on specific aspects of
the visual scene. In other words, top–down attention does not
need to participate in perceiving the gist of a certain scene
(Li et al., 2002; Larson and Loschky, 2009). Other evidence of
conscious perception with no direct attention processing comes
from studies based on pop-out effect, iconic memory, partial
reportability, and dual-task paradigm (Braun and Sagi, 1990;
Braun and Julesz, 1998; Block, 2007; Koch and Tsuchiya, 2007;
Tsuchiya and Koch, 2008; Lamme, 2010). In particular, it has been
observed that the gist of a natural scene as well as the gender
and identity of a face picture can be reported under dual-task
conditions (Mack and Rock, 1998; Reddy et al., 2004; Reddy et al.,
2006; Torralba et al., 2006; Alvarez and Oliva, 2008, 2009).
All the cases described above prove that attention and
consciousness can be dissociated and that some aspects of the
world can be perceived without consciousness. At least for
performing simple actions, which are profoundly based on innate
schemas or apprehended automatisms, as well as for paying
attention to simple stimuli, consciousness appears to be not
essential. This seems counterintuitive, as we are used to think
that consciousness is one of the most important properties of
our brain, without which we would not be who we are. It
is the fact that we are conscious that makes us behave the
way we do. For example, we would not be able to learn to
speak a new language or to play a musical instrument without
being conscious of what we are actually doing. Consciousness,
therefore, seems to be fundamental for dealing with unexpected
situations and new stimuli, and for performing novel tasks
(Baars, 1997). Furthermore, sophisticated emotional experiences
cannot be appropriately evaluated by unconscious individuals
(Damasio, 1999). Consciousness is also necessary for making
decisions, for the voluntary control of actions, for making plans
and programs for the future, for recalling memories from the past
and for building a sense of self (Baars, 1997). In general, it seems
that all our major mental functions, such as reasoning, creative
thought, imagination, empathy (Haladjian and Montemayor,
2016), evaluation of complex feelings (Tsuchiya and Adolphs,
2007), memory retrieval, and action planning can occur and
develop in the presence of consciousness (Zeman, 2001).
The above considerations suggest that the functional roles
of consciousness and attention are radically different. This
position is also compatible with an evolutionary framework that
considers consciousness and attention two distinct functions
and adaptations of biological organisms (Montemayor and
Haladjian, 2015). Within this picture, attention is seen as a
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primitive cognitive function and one of the earliest adaptations
of the nervous system, capable of selecting and filtering relevant
information for higher-level processing. Types of attention
evolved independently and prior to phenomenal consciousness,
and allowed the representations of complex multi-feature objects
and their maintenance in working memory systems. This was
an essential step to develop consciousness, as attention provided
the scaffolding for the elaboration of more complex cognitive
functions beyond the detection of simple features, including
object tracking, visual search tasks, and object recognition
(Haladjian and Montemayor, 2015). Therefore, dissociation
between the two faculties can also be sustained from an
evolutionary perspective.
In sum, consciousness seems to be a process capable of
allowing the elaboration of information so as to construct a
survey of what is going on inside and outside the body, while
attention seems to be the capacity of the mind to shift and
appreciate the sensory relevance from one perception to another.
In other words, the conscious faculty of the mind can be thought
of as a synthesizer, whereas the attentional faculty of the mind
can be thought of as an analyzer (van Boxtel et al., 2010). This
difference at the conceptual, psychological, and evolutionary level
is supposed to be reflected at the neurophysiological level into
distinct neural correlates for consciousness and attention.
BRAIN MECHANISMS AT THE ROOT OF
CONSCIOUSNESS AND ATTENTION
Neural Correlates of Conscious
Processing
The neural correlates of consciousness have been defined as
the minimal neural mechanisms that are together necessary and
sufficient for experiencing any conscious percept (Crick and
Koch, 1990). As we have seen, consciousness is a process that
unfolds along two dimensions (wakefulness and phenomenal
contents). The quest for the neural structures that are important
for the level of consciousness has come from classic and
modern lesion inquiries, as well as from fMRI investigations,
which show that consciousness is supported by a complex
interplay of different networks, including the ascending reticular
activating system (ARAS) in the brainstem, the non-specific
nuclei of the thalamus, and the widespread thalamocortical
projections to anterior cingulate, posteromedial cortex and
fronto-parietal association cortices (Tsuchiya and Adolphs, 2007;
Cavanna et al., 2013).
The level of vigilance can be modulated by the dynamics
of resting state and task-engaged networks. According to the
‘default mode’ paradigm of brain function, a system of extensively
interconnected cortical regions located mainly on the medial
portion of the hemispheres, which is more active during rest
than during perceptual and attentional engagement with the
environment, is supposed to be crucial to the maintenance
of consciousness (Raichle et al., 2001; Nani et al., 2013).
In turn, the posteromedial parietal areas (posterior cingulate,
retrosplenial cortex and precuneus), together with the medial
frontal, anterior cingulate and lateral parietal cortices are more
active when the brain is engaged in internal monitoring and in
processing information related to self (Cavanna and Trimble,
2006; Cavanna, 2007). This functional network exhibits strong
connections not only between its components, but also with
fronto-parietal association areas and non-specific thalamic nuclei
(Parvizi et al., 2006).
The neuroscientific research on the phenomenal contents of
consciousness highlights the activation of structures that are
thought to be involved in processing specific conscious percepts.
Studies on the neural correlates of phenomenal consciousness
have investigated the conditions in which the same sensory
information can be processed in presence or in absence of
awareness (Moutoussis and Zeki, 2002). This research provides
evidence that the initial steps of the conscious perception of a
visual stimulus occurs in the very same areas that are activated
when the perception of the stimulus is unconscious; what varies
between the two conditions is that in the former brain activity
is much more intense than in the latter. These studies have led
to the identification of important brain nodes, whose activity
with a certain degree of intensity within a network is supposed
to be fundamental in order to progressively build a conscious
perception of the features or objects of the world.
Let us take for example the case of visual consciousness. It has
been observed that within the ventral visual system the area V4
performs an elaboration that is essential for having the subjective
and phenomenal experience of color (Zeki, 1973, 1983). This
area is also supposed to be involved in the selective extraction
of features related to shape and depth representation (Roe et al.,
2012). It seems therefore that if V4 is selectively damaged (due
to a lacunar stroke, for instance), the individual will be unable
to experience color. Conversely, if V4 is electrically stimulated
(during brain surgery, for instance), the patient will experience
color. However, this has been debated (Cowey and Heywood,
1997) and thus far there is no consensus on the matter (Roe
et al., 2012). It is more likely that the activity of this region
might be essential but not sufficient for the conscious perception
of color. According to a number of fMRI studies, in order to
have a full-fledged visual conscious experience something further
needs to be added, namely, a complex and dynamical interaction
among other brain areas, especially those, it has been claimed,
of the fronto-parietal network (Dehaene and Naccache, 2001;
Naghavi and Nyberg, 2005).
The suggestion that consciousness depends on the global
activation of a large-scale cortical network has led to the idea that
the neural correlates of visual conscious perception are not to be
found in the primary or secondary visual cortices, but, rather, in
the association activity of the fronto-parietal system (Dehaene
and Naccache, 2001; Rees et al., 2002; Bor and Seth, 2012).
Similarly, it has been proposed that the neural correlates of visual
consciousness should be divided into primary and secondary
brain areas, whose early activity in the occipital lobe may support
the first perceptual discriminations among stimuli and later
activity in fronto-parietal areas may support the integration of
different visual features that are contingent on the outcomes
of the earlier perceptual processing (Pins and Ffytche, 2003).
Reentrant signaling mechanisms are supposed to lie at the root
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of these different types of elaboration (Seth and Baars, 2005).
This recursive processing is considered to be the combined flow
and integrated outcome of afferent and recurrent activity across
a series of cortical areas (Pollen, 2003). It therefore appears to be
one of the predominant forms of communication between brain
networks (Di Lollo et al., 2000).
Important reentrant circuits are not only cortico-cortical but
also thalamocortical. Especially with regard to the thalamus, it
has been proposed that this complex structure may play a pivotal
role in supporting consciousness (Ward, 2011). The numerous
nuclei of the thalamus are extensively connected with the cortex,
from which they receive feedback projections (Nieuwenhuys
et al., 2007). It has been hypothesized that especially the
thalamic reticular nucleus (TRN) may play a role in modulating
consciousness by regulating the local 40-Hz oscillations that are
observed in many parts of the brain (Newman, 1995; Min, 2010).
Indeed, the capacity of the thalamus to synchronize cortical
activity has been repeatedly observed (Llinas et al., 1998, 1999;
Herrero et al., 2002). Furthermore, it has been observed that the
abolishment of inhibitory interactions between the neurons of the
TRN and other thalamic neurons significantly increases absence
epileptic seizure-like and low-frequency synchronous oscillations
within the dorsal thalamic nuclei (Huntsman et al., 1999).
This finding provides evidence that such inhibiting mechanism
might play a role in preventing the neural hyper-synchrony
that characterizes generalized seizures and their accompanying
state of unconsciousness (Steriade, 2005). Notably, only two
places in the brain can abolish consciousness if damaged
bilaterally: the ARAS and the intralaminar nuclei of the thalamus.
These thalamic nuclei are intensively connected with both the
ARAS and much of the rest of the brain (Ward, 2011). These
diffusely projecting thalamic neurons are supposed to constitute
a pathway capable of subserving the dimension of the level of
consciousness by propagating synchronous oscillations across
the brain so as to create a coherent baseline of neural activity
(Jones, 2001, 2002, 2009). Within this picture, the thalamic
nuclei, in combination with the brainstem arousal system, can
determine and maintain thalamo-cortical synchronization at
40 Hz (vigilance or wakefulness) or at much lower frequencies,
in the delta (2–3 Hz) range (sleep) (Ward, 2011).
The relationship between consciousness and synchronous
neural activity has been repeatedly emphasized (Tononi and
Edelman, 1998a,b; Rodriguez et al., 1999; Srinivasan et al., 1999;
Edelman and Tononi, 2000; Engel and Singer, 2001; Ward, 2002,
2003; Melloni et al., 2007). In particular, the process of brain
synchronization appears therefore to be a fundamental ingredient
for binding together a multitude of attributes within a single
conscious experience (Singer, 1999).
Undoubtedly, this complex picture makes consciousness a
matter of degrees. A phenomenal content of consciousness
is progressively constructed and refined passing through the
elaboration of different brain areas until it is completely
processed. It is as if the primary and secondary sites of perception
do an early and preconscious draft of the content; then this
‘protocontent’ is passed on for further processing to other areas,
which are in a higher position in the cortical hierarchy, until
the content reaches the final stage and is broadcast throughout
the global workspace of the fronto-parietal system, where it
becomes eventually conscious. Three stages have been proposed
to account for this elaboration: subliminal, preconscious, and
conscious (Dehaene et al., 2006). The first stage (i.e., subliminal)
is not strong enough to produce the emergence of conscious
experience. The second stage (i.e., preconscious) is strong enough
but, without the help of attention, cannot produce a content that
enters the global workspace. In other words, the preconscious
stage is supposed to be confined to sensori-motor processors
within occipito-temporal loops and its contents, though they
can cause priming at multiple levels, cannot be reported. The
third stage (i.e., conscious) is strong enough and, at the same
time, can produce a reportable content that enters the global
workspace when it is processed under the light of attention. In
this theoretical model, the movie of consciousness is directed by
attention, which decides which content can or cannot play its part
on the theater of conscious experience.
It can be claimed that this elaboration may apply to every
type of conscious content, not just to the visual ones. Each
phenomenal content (be it visual, auditory, tactile, gustatory,
and somatosensory) needs to be analyzed in increasingly
sophisticated steps so as to emerge consciously as an object
of thought and perception. As we have seen, along this chain
of processing phases, certain brain nodes might be more
fundamental than others (such as V4 for color representation),
the impairment of which may lead to the lack of capacity
to experience the relative conscious feature (for instance,
achromatopsia in case of V4 disruption or lesion). At this
point, the absence or defects of the conscious percept could be
interpreted in two different ways. On the one hand, it could
be argued that if the final stage of conscious processing is not
accomplished, that is, if a certain aspect of the phenomenal
content does not enter the fronto-parietal system, then it is
not possible to consciously perceive that aspect. On the other
hand, it could be argued that the aspect of the content, which
is not consciously perceived, remains under the threshold of
consciousness only because the function of the disrupted node
cannot be replaced by the compensation of other areas (Figure 2).
This second view applies the idea of modularity not only to
simple mental functions, such as sensory detection, but also
to higher-order mental functions, such as memory formation,
language and consciousness (Sperber, 2001; Barrett and Kurzban,
2006; Carruthers, 2006), and contends that the so-called ‘final
stage’ in which the phenomenal content is processed by the
fronto-parietal system is the necessary and sufficient stage of
consciousness (Nani and Cavanna, 2012). In contrast, each
brain node would be already in itself both necessary and
sufficient for the emergence of a certain feature in the conscious
experience. In other words, the neural structures responsible
for the contents of consciousness may rely on the activity
of domain-specific modules capable of processing in parallel
different chunks of phenomenal experience. Neurological
and neuropsychological conditions provide evidence that
consciousness can be specifically impaired (Nani and Cavanna,
2012). For instance, patients with epilepsy (especially during
focal seizures) can show the selective disruption and preservation
of cognitive performances, behavioral responses, and conscious
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FIGURE 2 | Schematic representation illustrating the two main theoretical approaches to the study of consciousness.
phenomena (Gloor, 1986, 1990; Porter, 1991). Studies on split-
brain patients highlighted subtle cognitive reorganizations in
which specific contents of consciousness are confined to one
hemisphere (Gazzaniga et al., 1963; Sperry, 1966; Teng and
Sperry, 1974). In turn, neuropsychological conditions, such
as blindsight, anosognosia, prosopagnosia, and neglect, show
that certain features of conscious experience can be selectively
damaged or abolished (Tranel and Damasio, 1985; Berti and
Rizzolatti, 1992; Bisiach, 1992; Weiskrantz, 1997). Thus, rather
than being represented in a single brain central system or global
workspace, a content of experience may become conscious in
the very neural structure that analyzes its attributes (Kanwisher,
2001). In a sense, the primary cortex would produce a set
of micro-consciousnesses specific for each sensory modality;
in turn, these micro-consciousnesses would be assembled by
the secondary cortical areas in a macro-consciousness, always
specific for each sensory modality, and, eventually, the diverse
macro-consciousnesses would be combined in a full-blown
conscious scenery (Zeki, 2007) (Figure 2).
The two approaches to the neural correlates of consciousness
have both advantages and disadvantages. As we have seen,
the model based on modularity seems to be more supported
by clinical evidence, as there are many conditions in which
consciousness appears to be variously fragmented and impaired,
in such a selective way which it makes convincing the idea
that the brain structures underlying consciousness may be
based on a modular architecture (Nani and Cavanna, 2012;
Gazzaniga, 2018). An exaggerated modular stance, however,
would lead to an unjustified proliferation of minute pieces
of consciousnesses. Since any brain processing area should
in principle produce a micro-consciousness, then we should
expect to find as many micro-consciousnesses as there are
brain processing areas. Still, some brain sites, such as the
cerebellum and the basal ganglia, do not appear to be directly
involved in building a conscious experience and, consequently,
do not produce micro-consciousnesses per se. Cerebellar agenesis
is a rare condition which is mainly associated with motor
impairment, postural and balance disturbances (Glickstein, 1994;
Velioglu et al., 1998). The absence of cerebellum or its functional
disruption can lead to deficits that are not only related to motor
processing but also to cognitive functions (Fiez et al., 1992;
Arrigoni et al., 2015; Dahlem et al., 2016). Similarly, lesions
to basal ganglia are associated with motor deficits and with
various cognitive processes (linguistic, attentional, mnestic, and
executive); in particular, their dysfunction has been related to
neurodevelopmental disorders (Riva et al., 2018). Therefore, both
cerebellum and basal ganglia seem to be fundamental for a
normal neurocognitive development (Stoodley, 2016) and for the
unconscious elaboration of certain cognitive features, but to date
there is no evidence that they are directly involved in phenomenal
conscious experience.
The modularity model runs into difficulties when it is required
to explain why the activity of certain assemblies of neurons
correlates well with conscious experience, while that of others
does not (Cavanna and Nani, 2014). What is more, at one
point all the different macro-consciousnesses eventually need to
converge and be combined in a global experience. So, the unified
conscious scenery might be dependent on the activity of large-
scale association networks, even if the various minute aspects of
the phenomenal contents are not.
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In turn, the central model based on the activity of a large-scale
fronto-parietal system seems to be capable of accounting well for
access consciousness (that is, the availability of representational
contents for use by different cognitive systems; Block, 1995) but
not for the synthesis of different percepts that one would expects
from a unitary and global scene of phenomenal consciousness.
Top–down attentional amplification is supposed to be a necessary
requirement for the conscious experience of contents, as it can
mobilize and make available to the global workspace the contents
produced by domain-specific processes (Dehaene et al., 1998). It
seems, therefore, that the fronto-parietal system is constrained
by attention to work serially rather than in parallel. This would
create a bottleneck that impedes the binding of different features
of the phenomenal world. Furthermore, the view that conscious
processing is solely supported by one system in the brain has
been criticized (Nani and Cavanna, 2012; Gazzaniga, 2018). First,
the boundaries of the fronto-parietal system are vague and it is
not exactly clear which frontal and parietal areas are effectively
parts of the system and which are not. Secondly, the exact role
of the frontal components in the fronto-parietal system is not
as yet understood (Boly et al., 2017). There are many clinical
cases in which lesions of frontal areas have been observed without
impairment of consciousness. For instance, after brain surgery
that involved the bilateral resection of prefrontal cortical areas,
patients were observed to be fully conscious (Penifield and Jasper,
1954; Kozuch, 2014; Tononi et al., 2016). In one case, a woman
exhibited a massive bilateral prefrontal lesion, which involved the
right basal, superior, medial and lateral prefrontal cortex, and the
left medial orbitofrontal, frontopolar, and frontal gyri; however,
even though she had evident deficits in cognitive functions,
her consciousness and perceptual capacities were not affected
(Markowitsch and Kessler, 2000). It is well known that lesions
involving medial prefrontal regions, in particular those affecting
the anterior cingulate cortex, can produce akinetic mutism, a
condition in which patients still have the capacity to visually track
stimuli but are unable to respond to commands (Cairns et al.,
1941). Typically, individuals that recover from this condition
report that they lacked any motivation to respond to stimuli,
even though they were fully conscious of them (Damasio and
Van Hoesen, 1983). Furthermore, when Broca’s area is injured,
speech production is impaired, but the damage does not produce
a relative loss in conscious speech perception (Blumenfeld, 2010).
Interestingly, damage to frontal areas can slightly increase the
threshold for detecting brief (16 ms) and masked visual stimuli,
but patients are nonetheless able to perceive them (Del Cul et al.,
2009), which suggests that frontal areas might have the role of
modulating consciousness rather than directly contributing to it
(Kozuch, 2014).
Other authors, however, argue against this view (Odegaard
et al., 2017). In particular, evidence that the frontal areas
(especially the prefrontal ones) might be involved in generating
consciousness comes mostly from experiments on conscious
vision. A number of studies have highlighted that transcranial
magnetic stimulation and lesion to human prefrontal cortex
can produce impairment in many aspects of visual perception
(Turatto et al., 2004; Ruff et al., 2006; Philiastides et al., 2011;
Lee and D’Esposito, 2012; Ritzinger et al., 2012; Chiang et al.,
2014; Rahnev et al., 2016). And some neuropsychological studies
have shown that patients with unilateral lesion to the prefrontal
cortex frequently exhibit deficits in visual tasks (Barcelo and
Knight, 2002). Still, it should be observed that the deficits
reported in these clinical and experimental cases largely involve
the modulation of visual experience rather than the contents
per se. In other words, prefrontal areas seem to be responsible
for regulating the ability to detect visual targets by modulating
activity in extrastriate regions and temporoparietal cortices
(Voytek et al., 2010). Therefore, the main role of the prefrontal
components of the fronto-parietal system seems to add aspects of
cognitive relevance to contents that appear to be already formed,
so that a damage or lesion to these areas may cause disturbance
to conscious perception caused by an impairment of executive
functions and attention, but not the loss of specific contents of
subjective experience.
There is, in contrast, abundant clinical evidence that damage
to posterior brain areas can selectively disrupt consciousness.
For instance, lesions of the right fusiform face area produce
prosopagnosia, a condition in which faces cannot be recognized
(Barton and Cherkasova, 2003). We have already seen that lesions
to the inferolateral occipital cortex can cause achromatopsia
(Barton, 2011), which in severe cases is accompanied by
unawareness of the deficit (von Arx et al., 2010). In turn,
damage to the occipital cortex can cause selective blindness
as well as visual agnosia, an incapacity of identifying objects,
or simultanagnosia, an incapacity of perceiving more than one
object at a time (Farah, 2004). Loss of somatosensory percepts,
instead, are caused by lesions in postrolandic cortex, while
impairment in the comprehension of speech and prosody are
caused by damage to left and right angular gyri (George et al.,
1996). Moreover, loss of motor awareness can be produced by
lesions of the inferior parietal lobule (Sirigu et al., 2004), and
deficits in the perception of single words or whole phrases
can be produced by lesions of the left lateral temporal cortex
(Blumenfeld, 2010). So, clinical evidence strongly suggests that
temporal, parietal, and occipital areas may be considered as
‘posterior hot zones’ capable of playing a direct role in the
construction and specification of the contents of phenomenal
consciousness (Boly et al., 2017).
Important questions, however, remain as yet unanswered. For
instance, how does the binding between different phenomenal
contents occur? How can the brain weave all the diverse percepts
in a unitary conscious scene? It should be noted that both
the modular model and the global workspace model do not
offer a solution to this problem. With regard to the former,
the phenomenal contents of conscious experience seem to be
processed independently of each other; with regard to the latter, a
central system must process information slowly and serially and,
as a consequence, work under the constraint of attending to each
content one at a time. But this is not what we daily experience.
In fact, we are always conscious of a variety of inputs coming
from the senses. The common idea that consciousness is a serial
processing of information cannot be correct. This is undoubtedly
true for attention, but not for consciousness, as phenomenal
contents need to be elaborated in parallel if they have to be
parts of a unitary experience. This is another distinction between
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these two brain faculties. Furthermore, we are always conscious
of a perceptual global scene within which different sensory
features seem to occur simultaneously. Therefore, the binding
performed by the brain does not only require the integration of
various perceptual elements, but also the temporal merge of these
elements. And this is another issue that needs an explanation.
Not only we are able to consciously perceive different aspects
of reality together, but we perceive them in a common temporal
framework, even though it is known that sensory perceptions are
processed at different timescales. For instance, visual information
reaches awareness in about 60 ms, while auditory information
in about 15 ms (Celesia, 1976; Lesevre, 1982; Kopinska and
Harris, 2004). There is, therefore, a temporal gap between the two
sensory modalities, but, quite astonishingly, when constructing
conscious experience of multisensory stimuli, the brain is able
to shift the perceived time of the visual component toward
that of the auditory component (Lewald and Guski, 2003).
The time of occurrence can be adjusted both when a visual
stimulus is presented before an auditory stimulus and when
the auditory stimulus is presented before a visual stimulus
(Jaekl and Harris, 2007). This temporal adjustment is crucial
for perceptual coherence and the mechanisms at its root are
fundamental for understanding consciousness. Sooner or later,
the neuroscience of consciousness will have to address these
important computational issues. This is not the place to propose a
comprehensive theory of consciousness; however, in section ‘The
Construction of the Conscious Experience’ we try to give some
suggestions as to how to tackle the fascinating intricacies of the
binding problem.
Neural Correlates of Attention
Processing
Over the last years, a number of fMRI and PET studies have
tried to shed light on the nature of the neural mechanisms
that underlie attention, which is defined as the capacity to
voluntarily or involuntarily give priority to some parts of the
information that is available at a given moment (Naghavi and
Nyberg, 2005). Investigations have revealed a distributed system
of brain areas that control attention by enhancing and regulating
the elaboration of specific aspects of information, and have
shown that attention correlates mostly with activation patterns in
the bilateral parietal and dorsolateral prefrontal cortices (Pessoa
et al., 2003). In particular, areas in the frontal eye field, superior
parietal lobule and intraparietal sulcus have consistently been
found to be active in various tasks involving spatially directed
attention (Gitelman et al., 1999; Kim et al., 1999; Rosen et al.,
1999; Hopfinger et al., 2000; Beauchamp et al., 2001; Corbetta
et al., 2002). Other activations frequently observed involve the
middle and inferior frontal gyrus, inferior parietal lobule, and
anterior cingulate cortex (Naghavi and Nyberg, 2005). Activity
in the parietal and frontal areas has been reported not only for
visual attention tasks, but also in attentive tasks involving other
sensory modalities. For example, a PET study investigated brain
activations while participants were attending to spectral and
spatial features of sounds (Zatorre et al., 1999). In addition to the
bilateral activation of auditory cortex, authors reported increases
in the activity of right superior parietal, right dorsolateral frontal,
and right premotor regions. Another PET study provided further
evidence for these findings: when listeners were engaged in
auditory spatial attention tasks, a set of frontal, temporal and
parietal regions was typically activated (Lipschutz et al., 2002).
These results suggest the existence of a multimodal large-
scale attentional system capable of operating independently of
the nature of performance (be it visual, auditory, etc.), along
with additional brain areas that may be recruited according
to current task demands. Within this multimodal system, two
main attentional networks have been identified (Corbetta and
Shulman, 2002). One follows a dorsal pathway and connects the
superior parietal lobule, the intraparietal sulcus and the frontal
eye field; the other follows a ventral pathway and connects the
temporoparietal junction (which is at the intersection of the
inferior parietal lobule and the superior temporal gyrus) and the
middle and inferior frontal gyri. The former is known as the
dorsal attention network (DAN) and is mainly associated with
goal-directed stimulus-response selection. The latter is known as
the ventral attention network (VAN) and is mainly associated
with the detection of behaviorally relevant stimuli. In other
words, the DAN is supposed to regulate the top–down voluntary
deployment of attention to locations or features, while the VAN
is supposed to mediate shifts of attention when triggered by
unattended or unexpected stimuli (Figure 3). This may lead
to think that DAN supports top-down attention, while VAN
supports bottom-up attention. Still, as we are going to see, the
conceptual distinction between the two types of attention has
been questioned at the neural level, as it could not correspond
to distinct patterns of networks’ activations.
The two networks seem to be slightly asymmetric in their
functional profiles. Neuroimaging data show that the DAN has
a bilateral functional organization, whereas the VAN might be
more lateralized to the right hemisphere (Corbetta et al., 2008).
However, these results have been questioned by other studies,
which have found bilateral activations of the VAN or activations
in the left temporoparietal junction during attentional tasks
FIGURE 3 | Lateral view of the brain showing the areas involved in the dorsal
attention network (DAN) and ventral attention network (VAN) (adapted from
Corbetta and Shulman, 2002). DAN (red): FEF, frontal eye field; SPL, superior
parietal lobule. VAN (green): IFG, inferior frontal gyrus; IPL, inferior parietal
lobule; MFG, middle frontal gyrus; STG, superior temporal gyrus; TPJ,
temporo-parietal junction.
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(Downar et al., 2000; Weidner et al., 2009; DiQuattro and Geng,
2011). Different functional activations between left and right
temporoparietal junctions were reported in a location-cueing
paradigm (i.e., Posner task): the left temporoparietal junction was
more activated in responses to both invalidly and validly cued
targets, whereas the right temporoparietal junction exhibited
stronger activations in responses to invalidly rather than validly
cued targets (Doricchi et al., 2010). Interestingly, in the two
hemispheres the temporoparietal junctions present different
patterns of structural connectivity. The right temporoparietal
junction exhibits higher connectivity with the insula, while the
left temporoparietal junction exhibits higher connectivity with
the inferior frontal gyrus (Kucyi et al., 2012). Asymmetries are
probably due to functional different patterns in the activations
of the right and left VANs, which, in turn, may derive from
different routes of anatomical connections. However, it is
important to highlight that DAN and VAN are supposed to
work in close synergy, even though they are well recognizable
and anatomically segregated cortical networks, in which certain
nodes have functional specializations for attentional control
(Vossel et al., 2014).
The two categorizations of attention (i.e., top–down and
bottom–up) can be well defined with regard to their origin of
information, but this conceptual dichotomy may not be perfectly
mirrored by distinct patterns of brain activation (Katsuki and
Constantinidis, 2014). These authors claim that, although both
types of attention can be related to different neural functions
and needs, they nonetheless rely upon the same DAN and VAN
pathways, so much so that they can simultaneously influence
and integrate other processes, such as visual and spatial search.
The same set of brain areas within the fronto-parietal network
seems to support both top–down and bottom–up attention, by
providing a priority map for selection of stimuli on the basis of
different source factors. Therefore, authors conclude that, at the
neurophysiological level, the distinction between the two types
of attention appears to be more arbitrary than real. However
that may be, we have seen that both top–down attention and
bottom–up attention can be dissociated from consciousness, and
that, taken together, imaging studies provide strong evidence
that a distributed fronto-parietal system is generally involved
in attentional tasks and may function to generate signals
(independently of their top–down or bottom–up sources) capable
of modulating activity in lower-level sensory and association
structures, which further suggests that prefrontal areas might
affect conscious experience indirectly, by engaging, disengaging
and redirecting attention, in accordance to the contingencies of
the current situation.
DISCUSSION
The Interplay of Conscious and Attention
Processing
Both psychological and neurophysiological considerations make
possible to clearly distinguish between consciousness and
attention. Although they are separate brain processes with
different functions, consciousness and attention are strictly
intertwined. While attention may be not essential for the
construction of the conscious phenomenal contents per se, it is
nonetheless fundamental for their conscious access. For instance,
visual recognition depends on attention even for highly familiar
and meaningful materials (Rees et al., 1999). This suggests that
distributed interactions between modality-specific posterior areas
and fronto-parietal regions are likely to subserve both attention
and focal awareness (Rees and Lavie, 2001).
The studies reviewed in this paper provide evidence that
attention and phenomenal consciousness involve overlapping
patterns of activity in temporal and parietal cortices. With regard
to phenomenal consciousness, these patterns of activations
have been associated with the integration of distributed
representations in multiple brain sites, which, rather than
converging to a single fronto-parietal system, seem to be
mainly localized in temporal, parietal, and occipital areas (Boly
et al., 2017). Therefore, the global neuronal workspace, in
which the phenomenal contents of experience emerge, might
be formed by the dynamics of different associative networks
in the back of the brain; these higher-order networks receive
information from sensory domain-specific areas or modules,
whose activity is the first cortical step toward the formation of
a full-blown phenomenal content. In turn, the temporo-parietal-
occipital workspace would be continuously scanned and accessed
attentively by DAN and VAN. These two attention networks can
be considered as a mental faculty representing the information
that is dominant at each moment within the brain.
According to this view, conscious experience would emerge
with the contribution of different processes, following a
precise hierarchical pathway. First, the brainstem and the
thalamocortical projections are required to maintain the state
of vigilance or alertness. This function is of fundamental
importance, as it enables all the other parts of the brain which
contribute to consciousness to operate at the same baseline.
We hypothesize that the maintenance of wakefulness may be
essential for binding different aspects of reality. It is the fact
that brain areas can process information at the same baseline
of vigilance that makes them capable of binding the various
features of this information. Sensory primary cortices begin
the construction of a specific phenomenal content through
different layers of elaboration. Then this initial processing of
what we can consider a ‘protocontent’ is distributed within the
associative networks in temporal, parietal and occipital cortices,
where it can become a full-blown conscious content. At the
root of these neural mechanisms there is a continuous mutual
exchange of information between specialized, associative and
integrative areas. This recurrent processing, which has been
proposed to be a key step in visual consciousness (Lamme,
2003, 2004), seems to be essential for building any other type
of conscious experience, as it enables a widespread diffusion of
information between brain regions processing different attributes
of the conscious scene. However, to maintain the coherence
as well as the unitary nature of the conscious scenery, we
propose that this recurrent processing may develop into a
temporal alignment of different percepts. Perceptual binding
might therefore be dependent on two neural processes: on the
one hand, the same activation baseline supported by brainstem
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and thalamocortical projections and, on the other, the temporal
adjustment of information recurrence. The temporal adjustment
is thought to be an intrinsic property of brain networks, which
are able to autonomously synchronize with each other by using
as benchmark the thalamocortical activation baseline. Changes
in short-term synaptic plasticity are supposed to be at the basis
of this dynamics that can transform brain networks in time
keepers (Buonomano and Maass, 2009). According to this view,
every cerebral area has the capacity to process and estimate time.
Overall, this mechanism would allow the construction of the
global conscious experience, as different phenomenal contents of
consciousness can be produced by synchronized neural networks
that work in parallel.
The Construction of the Conscious
Experience
As we have seen, synchronization is supposed to be a fundamental
ingredient for the construction of conscious experience. Now
the idea that at the basis of functional processing there
be a specific synchronization between different networks is
increasingly gaining interest in the field of connectivity analyses
(Lombardi et al., 2017). The dynamic interaction between brain
networks has been found to happen at different timescales
(Chang and Glover, 2010; Smith et al., 2012; Zhang et al., 2013;
Keilholz, 2014), so that it has been proposed that the functional
operations of the human brain are scale-free (Eguiluz et al.,
2005; He et al., 2010; Zhigalov et al., 2017). In virtue of the
coherence among physiological signals with different frequencies,
each temporal resolution may provide a different picture of the
same phenomenon. Furthermore, each functional network has
been found to be characterized by a specific electrophysiological
signature involving the combination of different brain rhythms
(Mantini et al., 2007). Synchronization (or the coalescence
of several neurophysiological rhythms) between large-scale
networks might therefore be an essential feature of the human
brain functional organization, whose temporal disruption may
lead to specific dysfunctions associated with brain disorders
(Uhlhaas and Singer, 2012). According to this approach, brain
networks are in an endogenous state of dynamical criticality,
which is characterized by a greater than random probability of
both long-standing intervals of phase-locking and occurrence of
great fast changes in the state of global synchrony (Kitzbichler
et al., 2009). Network hubs may play a pivotal role in regulating
and modulating the dynamics of the synchronization (Vlasov
and Bifone, 2017). In particular, the hubs defined as “connector
hubs” (i.e., hubs that can connect different networks in virtue of
their projections diversely distributed across communities) might
tune the connectivity of their neighbors to allow for appropriate
integration of information across different neural assemblies
(Bertolero et al., 2018).
In our theoretical framework, up until the stage of
synchronization, phenomenal consciousness is supposed to
develop without attention. Attention processing, which, as
we have seen, follows an independent route, would enter
this picture only afterward, when the fronto-parietal system
formed by DAN and VAN begins to focus the attentional
resources on specific contents of consciousness, giving to
them different degrees of awareness with the regulation of
their serial access and availability. Figure 4 outlines this
theoretical view. It shows that, from the neural perspective,
attention and the two main dimensions of consciousness
(wakefulness and phenomenal contents) can be defined
as essentially separate but sister processes of the brain,
with partially overlapping neural correlates within parietal
association networks.
Our proposal can be seen as a third approach to the study
of consciousness, which we propose to call the theory of
networks’ synchronization (NetSync). The NetSync theory of
consciousness tries to avoid the disadvantages of the central
and modularity models. First, it allows a parallel elaboration
of different contents of conscious experience, to which it can
attribute different degrees of awareness according to the current
focus of attention. Secondly, it puts forward a solution for
the binding problem, suggesting that the binding of different
phenomenal features may depend on two neural processes:
an activation baseline that is sustained by brainstem and
thalamocortical projections and a mechanism of temporal
alignment that is intrinsic to brain networks which process
specific contents of consciousness. Thirdly, it avoids the
unjustified proliferation of micro-consciousnesses, as it claims
that only the networks that participate in the synchronization
can contribute to the global conscious experience. Fourthly,
it can account for the dissociation between consciousness and
attention, suggesting that it occurs whenever there is a mismatch
in the synchronization between the networks underlying the
two faculties. In other words, with regard to this last point, it
seems that, according to the NetSync model, if there is not a
synchronization, because it is briefly delayed or prevented by
an experimental paradigm, between the fronto-parietal system
of attention and the temporo-parietal-occipital networks of
the contents of consciousness, then the stimulus cannot be
phenomenally perceived.
FIGURE 4 | The networks’ synchronization theory (NetSync) and
representation of the intersection (and partial overlapping) of the neural
correlates of consciousness and attention.
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Although it is possible, from a logical point of view, to
pay attention to something without any associated emotional
experience, emotional states and phenomenal consciousness
are known to influence the focus of attention as well as to
modulate the degree of responsiveness to external stimuli.
However, to include in this paper a discussion of the emotional
system and its relationship with consciousness and attention
would have largely exceeded the boundaries of the review. In
particular, we decided to not include in the discussion the
role played by the insular cortex and the salience network in
modulating consciousness and attention. The salience network,
which includes the anterior insula and dorsal anterior cingulate
cortex, is important for detection and mapping of external salient
inputs and task control (Dosenbach et al., 2007; Seeley et al.,
2007; Menon and Uddin, 2010; Uddin, 2015). It is supposed
to work in synergy with the DAN and to occupy the apex
of the hierarchical organization formed with DAN and the
default mode network (Zhou et al., 2018). In turn, the insular
cortex has been associated with the emotional modulation of
conscious experience (Craig, 2010; Seth et al., 2011). Still, it
is debated whether the insula can contribute by processing an
essential ingredient of consciousness or just an attribution, albeit
important, of a particular emotional and salient flavor to the
contents of experience. This last eventuality is supported by the
evidence that consciousness is preserved, as well as the capacity
of having feelings, after bilateral lesions of the insula (Damasio
et al., 2013). So, rather than being involved in phenomenal
consciousness (save for the gustatory cortex), the insula might
be fundamental for creating self-awareness (Modinos et al., 2009;
Manuello et al., 2018). Despite the doubts about the exact role
played by the insular cortex in conscious experience, the issue
as to whether or not emotional valence might be a necessary
varnish to the contents of consciousness and, more generally, to
the contents of thought, is an open and intriguing question for
future research.
CONCLUSION
The conceptual and psychological distinction between
consciousness and attention is also reflected at the
neurophysiological level. Consciousness and attention are
distinct and separate, albeit strictly intertwined, processes going
on in the brain. They have different functions as well as different
neural correlates. Consciousness has the function of creating
a continuous and coherent picture of reality, while attention
has the function of attributing relevance to the objects of
thought. Consciousness develops along two dimensions, that of
wakefulness and that of contents. It can also be conceptually
distinguished between phenomenal consciousness (how the
world appears to us) and access consciousness (when contents
are more or less vivid, intense, and available for focal awareness).
The neural correlates of consciousness are generated by the
synchronous activity of sensory and associative networks in
the temporal, occipital, and parietal cortices, which elaborate
information of specific features of conscious experience. We
propose that all these features are bound together in virtue of
the temporal alignment of multiple networks, which uses as
benchmark the thalamocortical activation baseline. The neural
correlates of attention are generated by a fronto-parietal system,
within which two main networks can be recognized, the DAN on
the one hand, and the VAN on the other. Both neural correlates
partially overlap each other in the parietal association networks.
In case of mismatch in the synchronization between the networks
subserving consciousness and attention, dissociation between
these two processes can occur.
Still, even though distinct and separate, each brain process
serves the other. Thanks to the role of attention, that incessantly
patrols the vast landscape of mental contents, phenomenal
consciousness can acquire cognitive relevance. Thanks to the
role of consciousness, that creates a consistent scenery of the
world, attention can provide focal awareness and make richer our
experience. Both are vital brain faculties, and their entanglement
is at the core of what it is like to be a human being.
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